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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Phillip Smalley asserts two claims of error in this case. First, he contends there is
insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult because in
order to be a “vulnerable adult” the alleged victim must have lacked “understanding or capacity”
and, while the State offered substantial evidence as to her physical infirmity, it utterly failed to
prove any mental deficits. Second, he contends the district court erred—under the Confrontation
Clause and the Idaho Rules of Evidence—in admitting the victim’s deposition in lieu of her live
testimony, as the State failed to show she was “unavailable” to testify.
In response, the State first attempts to distort the statutory definition of “vulnerable
adult,” asking this Court hold that that definition includes people with physical disabilities
which, although they have no impact whatsoever on mental capacity, render the adult unable to
physically resist a sexual assault. Because, for the reasons detailed below, the State’s fanciful
interpretation of the relevant statute is untethered from its plain language and a prior Idaho
Supreme Court interpretation, and is unsupported by the rules of statutory construction,
Mr. Smalley asks this Court to reject the State’s arguments, faithfully apply the law as it is
actually written, and reverse Mr. Smalley’s convictions.
Additionally, the State argues that the district court correctly ruled that the alleged victim
was “unavailable” to testify and, therefore, properly admitted her deposition at trial. It also
contends that, even if the district court erred in admitting the alleged victim’s deposition, any
such error is harmless.

Mr. Smalley responds to both arguments.

With regard to the

unavailability determination, he points out that the State’s argument assumes an incorrect
standard of review and relies on evidence that was not actually before the district court. On the
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State’s “harmless error” argument, Mr. Smalley observes that the State has misunderstood and
misapplied the “harmless error” standard, and he explains how, if the correct standard is properly
applied, it is clear that the State has failed to meet is burden of proof.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Smalley’s Appellant’s Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the State offer sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Smalley’s convictions for sexual
abuse of a vulnerable adult?

II.

Did the district court err in admitting Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition in lieu of live
testimony?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Failed To Offer Sufficient Evidence To Sustain Mr. Smalley’s Convictions For Sexual
Abuse Of A Vulnerable Adult
Mr. Smalley’s “sufficiency of the evidence” argument turns on the question of whether
the alleged victim, Frances Blankenburg, met the definition of a “vulnerable adult” under
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). (See App. Br., pp.11-18.) He argues that under section 18-1505(4)(e), the
State was required to prove inter alia, that she “lack[ed] sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate or implement decisions” regarding her person, but failed to do so.
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). Specifically, he contends the State failed to prove that, owing to her mental
deficits, Ms. Blankenburg was incapable of consenting to sexual contact, and so Mr. Smalley’s
convictions cannot stand.
In response, the State readily concedes that Ms. Blankenburg was “very mentally alert”
(Resp. Br., p.3 (quoting 3/9/16 Tr., p.524, Ls.1-2)) and makes no attempt whatsoever to argue
that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that, owing to some mental deficits,
Ms. Blankenburg was incapable of consenting to sexual contact (see generally id.). Rather, the
State’s sole argument is that the definition of “vulnerable adult” is broad enough to include
individuals who are physically infirm, though mentally alert, such that Mr. Smalley’s convictions
may be sustained based solely on evidence of Ms. Blankenburg’s physical limitations. (See
Resp. Br., p.8 (“The State’s theory was not that F.B. lacked the mental capacity to consent to sex,
but that she lacked the physical capacity to protect herself against unwanted sexual acts.”).)
The State’s arguments, however, represent a view of what the “vulnerable adult” statute
should say, as opposed to what it does say. While the idiom, “There ought to be a law!” is a
common refrain from those disapproving of a given set of circumstances, it is not a rule of
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statutory construction and should hold no sway in this Court’s interpretation of Idaho’s
“vulnerable adult” statute. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Cent., 151 Idaho 889, 89396 (2011) (rejecting the notion that a court may disregard the plain language of legislative intent
of statute in favor of what the court thinks the statute should say).
As the Verska Court explained,
“If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is
legislative, not judicial.” In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 565, 567, 149 P.3d 840,
842 (2006). The interpretation of a statute “must begin with the literal words of
the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning;
and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” State v.
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted).
151 Idaho at 893. The literal words of the statute at issue here plainly indicate that a physically
infirm adult with all of her mental faculties is not a “vulnerable adult.”
As noted in the prior briefs in this appeal, the term “vulnerable adult” is defined in
section 18-1505, Idaho Code, as follows:
[A] person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect himself
from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental impairment which
affects the person’s judgment or behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions
regarding his person, funds, property or resources.
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). This statute speaks of “physical or mental impairment,” but in either case,
that impairment must “affect[ ] the person’s judgment or behavior,” and it must do so to the
extent that “[s]he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity.” This is clearly a requirement that
goes to the person’s mental, not physical, fitness.
The State would have this Court parse the statute in such a way as to look only at certain
words out of context, and to give those words dubious interpretations, all in an effort to make the
statute apply to Ms. Blankenburg’s situation. Specifically, the State would have this Court pick
out only certain words in section 18-1505(4)(e), and read that statute to mean that an adult “who
5

is unable to protect himself … due to physical … impairment which affects the person’s …
behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient … capacity to … implement decisions,” is a
vulnerable adult. (See Resp. Br., p.5.) And, in doing so, the State would have this Court believe
that the terms “behavior,” “capacity,” and “implement decisions” all encompass the adult’s
physical ability, such that the statute contemplates that an individual who is physically infirm is a
“vulnerable adult” in the eyes of the law. However, important context is lost through the State’s
extensive use of ellipses to parse the statute. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (“The interpretation
of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.”) (quotation
marks omitted; emphasis added).
There is nothing about the terms emphasized by the State that suggests they plainly apply
to physical ability, especially when considered alongside the language the State glosses over.
For example, in describing the required impact of the adult’s “physical or mental impairment,”
the statute requires an effect on her “behavior” or “judgment.” Together these terms speak to the
adult’s mental state and thought processes. Certainly, the term “judgment” relates solely to the
adult’s thought processes. And, while the term “behavior” may include physical acts, it is not a
word that would logically be used to describe any and all physical acts. It is a more nuanced
term that speaks not only to physical acts themselves, but also to the appropriateness of those
acts.

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 155 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “behavior” as follows:

“Manner of having, holding, or keeping one’s self; manner of behaving, whether good or bad;
conduct; manners; carriage of one’s self, with respect to propriety and morals; deportment”);
THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 193 (1981) (hereinafter OXFORD
DICTIONARY) (defining “behaviour,” in relevant part, as follows: “Manner of conducting oneself
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in the external relations of life; demeanour, deportment, bearing, manners…. 2. Conduct, general
practice, course of life; course of action towards or to others, treatment of others ….”). As such,
like the word “judgment,” it goes to the adult’s thought processes, thus implicating a mental
component. Taken as a whole, therefore, the statute’s use of the phrase, “the person’s judgment
or behavior,” is a reference to the mental processes of the adult in question.
The statute also refers to a lack of “understanding or capacity.” Clearly, the adult’s
“understanding” is based on her mental state. And so too is her “capacity.” “Capacity,” as a
legal term, is defined in terms of mental ability: “Legal qualification (i.e., legal age),
competency, power or fitness. Mental ability to understand the nature and effects of one’s acts.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (emphasis added). Likewise, in common parlance, “capacity”
typically refers to a mental ability.

See, e.g., OXFORD DICTIONARY 333 (“4. Mental or

intellectual receiving power; ability to grasp or take in impressions, ideas, knowledge…. 5.
Active power or force of mind; mental ability, talent….. 6. The power, ability, or faculty for
anything in particular…. 10. Legal competency or qualification ….”); WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 203 (1988) (“1: legal competency or fitness … 3 a: an individual’s
mental or physical ability ….”). So while the word “capacity” could be used to describe physical
ability, such use would not be consistent with its primary definition. Further, its use alongside
“understanding” suggests the Legislature intended to give the term “capacity” its predominant
meaning, i.e., describing mental ability. See State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (2011) (“In
determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim noscitur a sociis, which means ‘a
word is known by the company it keeps.’”). To say that “capacity” in this context refers to
physical ability would be to ignore the plain and obvious meaning of that word as used in
context.
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Finally, the statute requires that the lack of understanding or capacity impact the adult’s
ability “to make or communicate or implement decisions.” In this context, the term “implement”
has a cognitive or mental focus as well. All three verbs in this clause—“make,” “communicate,”
and “implement”—modify the direct object (noun), “decisions,” which is a term that has a
decidedly mental component. In light of this context, all three should be understood to relate to
the adult’s decisional processes, which are dependent upon the adult’s mental fitness.
Thus, reading section 18-1505(4)(e) as a whole, it clearly relates to the mental condition
of the adult, such that only one with mental limitations may be deemed a “vulnerable adult”
under that statute. But even if the statute as a whole does not make this clear, the key phrase
“understanding or capacity” does. As noted, in order for an adult to be a “vulnerable adult”
under the statute, she must have an impairment affecting her “judgment or behavior to the extent
that [s]he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity,” I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e) (emphasis added),
and both “judgment” and “capacity” clearly relate to the adult’s mental abilities. “Capacity”
plainly refers to the adult’s mental abilities, not her physical capabilities, because, as noted, the
primary definition of “capacity” refers to the mental ability to understand.
This much was clearly recognized in State v. Knutsen, where the Supreme Court
recognized that sections 18-1505(e)(2) and 18-1505B provide for a class of adults who, like
children, are legally incapable of consenting to sexual contact. 158 Idaho 199, 204-05 (2015).
Clearly, by speaking in terms of the legal ability to consent, the Supreme Court read section 181505(e)(2) to relate to the mental condition of the adult at issue, not the physical ability to fend
off an assault.
But even if this Court is inclined to accept the State’s contention that “capacity” could
reasonably be given a secondary or tertiary meaning which is broad enough to encompass both
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mental and physical capabilities, acceptance of that position only introduces an ambiguity into
the statute. See State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 54, 56 (2013) (“A statute is ambiguous where the
language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.”).

And where a statute is

ambiguous as to the elements or punishment for a crime, the “rule of lenity” dictates that Idaho’s
courts will strictly construe the statute in favor of the accused. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274
(2004). So even if this Court accepts that the term “capacity” is ambiguous, in that in addition to
being given its primary definition, it could also reasonably be given a broader alternative
definition, the rule of lenity dictates that this Court adopt the narrower construction.
While it may be true that there ought to be a law to better protect physically infirm
individuals like Ms. Blankenburg from sexual assault, the reality is that the statute at issue in this
case is not such a law. Nor may it be transformed into such a law by this Court. Applying basic
rules of statutory construction, the State’s fanciful interpretation of the definition of “vulnerable
adult” must be rejected; clearly, the statute turns on the mental deficits of the adult, and whether
those deficits rendered the adult unable to lawfully consent to sexual conduct.

Since

Ms. Blankenburg suffered no mental deficits, she was not a “vulnerable adult” under the statute.

II.
Because Ms. Blankenburg Was Not “Unavailable,” The District Court Erred In Admitting Her
Deposition In Lieu Of Live Testimony
A.

Introduction
Mr. Smalley submits that the district court erred in ruling Ms. Blankenburg “unavailable”

within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules within the Idaho Rules of
Evidence, and that because Ms. Blankenburg was not actually “unavailable,” it further erred in
admitting her deposition (a transcript and the audio/video recording) in lieu of her live testimony.
(See App. Br., pp.19-27.)
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In response, the State contends that Ms. Blankenburg’s physical infirmities did render her
unavailable to testify, such that admission of her deposition in lieu of live testimony was not
error. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-13.) Alternatively, it argues that even if the district court erred, any
such error was harmless. (See Resp. Br., pp.13-16.) The State’s arguments contain a host of
flaws, the most significant of which are detailed below.

B.

Standard Of Review
In trying to argue that the district court did not err in ruling Ms. Blankenburg

“unavailable,” the State struggles with the applicable standard of review. In its section heading,
it suggests the “unavailability” determination must be reviewed for clear error (see Resp.
Br., p.8); however, it then goes on to argue that it should reviewed for an abuse of discretion (see
Resp. Br., pp.9-13). And at no point does the State refute, or even address, Mr. Smalley’s
contention that the district court’s “unavailability” ruling must be reviewed de novo, at least with
regard to his constitutional claim. (See Resp. Br., pp.9-13.) As Mr. Smalley previously argued,
the meaning of “unavailable” is a legal question, clearly subject to de novo review; further, the
question of whether the facts of the case satisfy a given constitutional standard (in this case,
“unavailability”) is reviewed de novo as well. (See App. Br., pp.23-24 & nn.12-13.)

C.

Because The State Failed To Establish That Ms. Blankenburg Was “Unavailable,”
Admission Of Her Deposition In Lieu Of Her Live Testimony Violated The
Confrontation Clause And Idaho Rule Of Evidence 804
While the State has cited a number of cases in which elderly, infirm witnesses were

deemed to be “unavailable” (see Resp. Br., p.10), all are distinguishable from this case because
they were decided under other jurisdictions’ evidentiary rules. See United States v. Campbell,
845 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying F.R.E. 804(a)(4)); Caldwell v. State, 916

10

S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. App. 1996) (applying a Texas rule of evidence); State v. Christian, 364
S.W.3d 797, 801-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (applying a Missouri rule of evidence). Further, in
each of those cases, there was an indication that the witness in question had a true inability to
attend trial, whereas here Ms. Blankenburg’s attendance would merely have been inconvenient.
See Campbell, 845 F.2d at 1377-78 (noting an explicit trial court finding earlier in the case that
the witness was “unable to travel” to attend court, and an implicit finding that, under the
circumstances, the inability to travel had not changed); Caldwell, 916 S.W.2d at 676 (holding
that where there was evidence that there was “no way” for the witness to make the drive to the
courthouse in light of her then-existing medical condition, there was no error in the trial court
finding her to be unavailable); Christian, 364 S.W.3d at 801-02 (holding that where there was
evidence that the witness “was not able to come to court due to his age and infirmity,” there was
no error in finding the witness unavailable).
In contrast to the authorities upon which the State relies, in this case, there is no evidence
that Ms. Blankenburg was truly unable to attend court. As was discussed in Mr. Smalley’s
opening brief on appeal, the State supported its motion in limine with testimony from a nurse
(Mary Jean Tranfo) and two letters from physicians (Drs. Martin and Lindley). (See App.
Br., pp.5-7.) Also, pursuant to the court’s request, the parties stipulated that it could consider the
deposition video and transcript, presumably to make a lay evaluation of Ms. Blankenburg’s
condition. (See 1/8/16 Tr., p 54, L.17 – p.56, L.14.) None of these materials, however, in any
way suggest that Ms. Blankenburg was truly incapable of going to court, or that her appearance
at trial would be detrimental to her health. (See R. Ex., pp.88, 89; 1/8/16 Tr., p.13, L.5 – p.37,
L.22; Trial Ex. 1A.) So, rather than argue the evidence actually before the court, the State now
points to a prior letter from Dr. Lindley, arguing that earlier letter supports a conclusion that
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travel to court would have been harmful to Ms. Blankenburg’s health. (Resp. Br., p.11.) That
earlier letter from Dr. Lindley had indeed contained an opinion that Ms. Blankenburg could not
travel; however, that letter was not before the court in conjunction with the State’s motion in
limine.1

And there appears to be a good reason for that—the letter was outdated, as

Ms. Blankenburg’s condition had become more stable. Dr. Lindley wrote her first letter on
September 1, 2015, opining very clearly that, owing to her physical problems, Ms. Blankenburg
could not tolerate a drive to Coeur d’Alene or a court appearance. (R., p.86.) That was
approximately nine months after Ms. Blankenburg had been admitted to hospice because “she
was losing weight and [was] unable to swallow and had [a] profound decline in abilities,” and
was not expected to live more than six months. (1/8/16 Tr., p.13, L.21 – p.14, L.18.) However,
in her second letter (dated January 7, 2016), which was the one offered by the State in support of
its motion in limine, Dr. Lindley noted that Ms. Blankenburg’s “medical condition has been
fairly stable in recent months,” and there was no claim that Ms. Blankenburg could not travel to
Coeur d’Alene or sit through a court appearance. (R. Ex., p.89.) Clearly, Ms. Blankenburg’s
condition had stabilized sufficiently that it was appropriate for Dr. Lindley to give an updated
assessment of her condition, and that assessment was not nearly as disconsolate as the
assessment she had provided more than four months earlier. Regardless though, in evaluating

1

In a bid to have this Court believe that Dr. Lindley’s prior letter was considered by the district
court in evaluating the State’s motion in limine, the State quotes from that letter in its argument
and points out that that “letter was referenced by the district court in is memorandum decision
….” (Resp. Br., p.11 & n.1; accord Resp. Br., p.13.) However, the State fails to mention that
the earlier letter was not submitted in conjunction with the State’s motion in limine, it was not
admitted at the hearing on that motion, and the parties did not stipulate to its consideration by the
court. The State also fails to make it clear that in referencing the earlier letter of Dr. Lindley, the
district court only did so in its recitation of the procedural history of the case to that point, not in
its consideration of the merits. (See R., pp.292-95.) The fact is that Dr. Lindley’s prior letter
was never before the court in conjunction with the ruling at issue in this appeal. And for the
State to now argue that that letter supports the district court’s ruling is improper.
12

Mr. Smalley’s claim on appeal, this Court should rely only on the evidence actually before the
district court—Dr. Lindley’s second letter, Dr. Martin’s letter, Ms. Tranfo’s testimony, and the
deposition itself—and that evidence is insufficient to support a conclusion that Ms. Blankenburg
had an unqualified inability to attend trial.
Because the State failed to establish that Ms. Blankenburg was “unavailable” within the
meaning of either the United States Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence or the
Idaho Rules of Evidence, it was error for the district court to have admitted her deposition in lieu
of her live testimony.

D.

The State Has Failed Prove The Error In Admitting Ms. Blankenburg’s Deposition Was
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Just because the district court erred in admitting certain evidence, that error, in and of

itself, does not necessarily compel a new trial. The Idaho Criminal Rules provide that “[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.” I.C.R. 52; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (holding that even
a constitutional error may be so minor in terms of its effect that it may be deemed harmless).
This is the “harmless error” rule.
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-22 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court held that “the
harmless error test established in Chapman is now applied to all objected-to error,” regardless of
whether the error is of a constitutional dimension or, instead, is an error under Idaho law. Under
Chapman, once an error has been established, it is incumbent upon the government to show,
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). “To say that an error
did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else
the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.
13

391, 403 (1991).2 The issue is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, independently of the inadmissible evidence. Id. at 404-05.
The State argues that any error in admitting Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition in lieu of her
live testimony was harmless. (See Resp. Br., pp.13-16.) However, the State’s “harmless error”
argument could hardly be more off-base.
Initially, the State argues that an error is harmless if the jury would inevitably have found
the defendant guilty even in the absence of the error. (Resp. Br., p.14.) In fact though, the
United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such a construction of the harmless error
standard: “The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
Next, building upon its erroneous interpretation of the harmless error standard, the State
argues that, had Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition not been admitted, an entirely different chain of
events would have occurred at trial.

(See Resp. Br., pp.14-16.)

It speculates that

Ms. Blankenburg would have testified consistently with her deposition, it guesses that she would
not have been effectively impeached on cross-examination, and it assumes the jury would have
viewed her sympathetically. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-16.) Based on this fanciful set of alternative
circumstances, the State asks this Court to find that Ms. Blankenburg’s live testimony would
have been at least as persuasive as her deposition testimony, such that the jury inevitably would
have convicted Mr. Smalley. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-16.) However, if it is not for this Court to
guess whether the jury would have convicted Mr. Smalley in the absence of the district court’s

2

A separate, unrelated portion of Yates was overruled in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4
(1991).
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error, Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279, surely it is not for this Court to speculate as to what the verdict
might have been under a wholly imaginary set of facts. Thus, the State’s entire “harmless error”
argument ought to be disregarded.
Under the proper construction of the harmless error standard, the State has failed to meet
its burden in this case. As noted, the relevant question is whether this Court can conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. See Chapman, 386
U.S. at 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 221. Here, the error was admission of Ms. Blankenburg’s
deposition. And that deposition was the single most important piece of evidence for the State, as
it provided direct evidence of the criminal conduct allegedly committed by Mr. Smalley, and it
was in the alleged victim’s own words. Because that deposition was so undoubtedly critical to
its case below, the State has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that its erroneous
admission did not “contribute” to the verdict.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Smalley respectfully
requests that this Court: (1) reverse his two convictions for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult for
lack of sufficient evidence, and order that acquittals be entered as to both counts; (2) vacate his
conviction for sexual penetration with a foreign object based on the erroneous admission of
Ms. Blankenburg’s deposition in lieu of her live testimony; and (3) remand this case to the
district court for a new trial on the sexual penetration with a foreign object charge.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2017.

_________/s/________________
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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